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NOTES 

SECURITIES LAW-ALL IN THE FAMILy-UNITED STATES v. 

CHESTMAN: FINDING A FIDUCIARY OR OTHER SIMILAR RELATION 

OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE UNDER RULE lOb-5 FOR FAMILY 
MEMBERS OF A FAMILy-CONTROLLED PUBLICLY TRADED 
CORPORATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Section lO(b)l and Rule lOb-52 compose the government's 
most effective weapon against insider trading.3 While many argu­
ments can be made as to their suitability for such a function, due to 
1. Manipulative and deceptive devices, 15 v.s.c. § 78j (1988). 

Text of section lO(b) states as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly 

or indirectly .... (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe ...." [d. 
2. Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 
(1993). 
Rule 10b-5 reads as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ... 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security. 
[d. 
3. Some of the other tools in the government's arsenal in the fight against insider 
trading include section 14(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 V.S.c. 
§ 78n(e) (1988); Rule 14e-3(a), transactions in securities on the basis of material, non­
public information in the context of tender offers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1993); In­
sider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as 
amended at 15 V.S.c. §§ 7Sc, 780, 78t, 78u, 78ff (1988 & Supp. 1993»; Insider Trading 
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 
(codified as amended at 15 V.S.c. §§ 78c, 780, 78t-1, 78u, 78u-1, 78ff, 78kk (1988 & 
Supp. 1993»; Mail Fraud Act, ch. 5, §§ 300, 301, 17 Stat. 283 (1872), ch. 321, § 215, 35 
Stat. 1088 (1909) (current version at 18 V.S.C. §§ 1341-1342 (1988 & Supp. 1993»; 
Wire, Radio, Television Fraud Act, ch. 879, § 18,66 Stat. 711 (1952) (current version at 
18 V.S.C. § 1343 (1988 & Supp. 1993». 
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the current state of the law, no argument can be made against the 
statement that section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 are the best tools the 
government possesses in the fight against insider trading. 
Yet in United States v. Chestman,4 the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit has created a gaping loophole in the law regarding 
section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 cases, which affects the ability of the 
government to successfully prosecute all insider trading activities 
on an equal footing. 
In United States v. Chestman 5 the Second Circuit, sitting en 
banc, reversed the defendant's conviction on ten counts of securi­
ties fraud in violation of section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5, but affirmed 
the conviction on ten counts of fraudulent trading in connection 
with a tender offer in violation of section 14(e)6 and Rule 14e-3(a).7 
The defendant, Robert Chestman, was a stockbroker. Upon receiv­
ing inside information about the pending sale of the publicly traded 
Waldbaum Corporation, Chestman performed trades that person­
ally benefitted his clients and himself.s 
In reversing Chestman's lOb-5 convictions, the Second Circuit 
held that material nonpublic information transferred between fam­
ily members within the context of a family-controlled publicly 
traded corporation does not create a "fiduciary or similar relation 
of trust and confidence."9 The decision has the effect of giving fam­
ily members in family-controlled corporations and their tippees 
carte blanche to tip and trade on inside information with no restric­
tions.10 In his dissent, Judge Winter proposed a rule to fill the gap 
4. 903 F.2d 75, 78-80 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). 
5. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). 
6. 15 U.S.c. § 78n(e) (1988). 
7. Transactions in securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information in the 
context of tender offers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1993). The section 14(e) and Rule 
14e-3(a) violations in Chestman will not be discussed in this Note. For a consideration 
of the section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3(a) aspect of Chestman see William J. Cook, Note, 
From Insider Trading to Unfair Trading: Chestman II and Rule 14e-3, 22 STETSON L. 
REV. 171 (1992). 
In the district court, Chestman had also been convicted of ten counts of mail fraud 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1342 (1988), and one count of perjury in violation of 18 
U.S.c. § 1621 (1988). Chestman, 903 F.2d at 76. In the en banc consideration by the 
Second Circuit, the mail fraud convictions were reversed, the perjury count was not 
under consideration, thus the panel's reversal of that conviction stood. Chestman, 947 
F.2d at 554. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 79-93. 
9. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567. See also infra note 97 and accompanying text; infra . 
text accompanying notes 101-19. 
10. The impact of this decision can be seen by looking at the abundance of family­
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and successfully net family-members and their tippees involved in 
insider trading. l1 Although Judge Winter's rule may be an effective 
tool against insider trading, it is unnecessary because the answer 
lies within a proper analysis of the case law in the area. 
Section I of this Note discusses the traditional and misappro­
priation theories of liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as 
well as explaining tippee liability. In Section II there is a considera­
tion of the Chestman decision, including the dissenting opinion of 
Judge Winter. Section III contains a discussion of the circum­
stances under which family relationships are or should be consid­
ered fiduciary or confidential in nature, and whether there is a 
distinction between a fiduciary and confidential relationship and 
concludes that there is such a distinction. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Legislative History of Section lOeb) and Rule lOb-5 
Section lO(b) was a part of the landmark legislation, "The Se­
curities Exchange Act of 1934;"12 however, it is unclear whether 
Congress intended section lO(b) to be used as a weapon against 
insider trading.13 In the article The Original Conception of Section 
lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the author argues that section 
10(b) "was intended to empower the Securities and Exchange Com­
controlled corporations in existence, and by looking at the number of insider trading 
cases involving family relations in recent years. See United States v. Chestman, 903 
F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 1759 (1992); United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other 
grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990); SEC v. Hurton, 739 F. Supp. 704 (D. Mass. 1990); SEC v. Saul, No. CIV.A90-C­
2633,50 SEC Doc. 1171,1992 WL 22730 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 1992); SEC v. Hellberg, No. 
CIV.A.89-C-648-A, 1990 WL 321967 (D. Utah Oct. 29, 1990); SEC v. Raab, No. 
CIV.A.90-C-3291, 47 SEC Doc. 975, 1990 WL 322278 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20,1990); SEC v. 
Karcher, No. CIV.A88-2021, 40 SEC Doc. 950, 1988 WL 237180 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 
1988). 
The number of insider trading cases involving family relationships led one critic of 
the Chestman decision to observe that "the 'family fact pattern' is standard fare in the 
law of insider trading." Karl A Groskaufmanis, Chestman Revisited: The Slow Death 
of Fraud, 6 INSIGHTS 12, 19 (1992). 
11. See infra text accompanying note 124 for the text of Judge Winter's proposed 
rule. 
12. 15 U.S.c. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. 1993). 
13. Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 55-69 (1980) (concluding that the legislative history of the 1934 Act indicates 
that Congress was not concerned with insider trading); Steve Thel, The Original Con­
ception of Section IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990) 
(history of section 10(b) including legislative history). 
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mission (SEC) to· regulate any practice that might contribute to 
speculation in securities or tend to move security prices away from 
investment value."14 A different position has been proclaimed in 
the article Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions.1s The au­
thor argues that "in regulating insider trading under Rule lOb-5 the 
lower federal courts and the SEC have, been operating without ben­
efit of support from the legislative history of the 1934 Act or from 
the language of section lOeb)."16 
Even if the 1934 Act did not intend section lO(b) to deal with 
insider trading; certain events that have taken place since have 
demonstrated that Congress has endorsed just such a purpose for 
section lO(b). In The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of1984 and Its 
Effect on Existing Law17 this position is espoused. While an exami­
nation of the legislative history suggests Congress did not intend the 
Act to apply to a violation along the lines of Rule lOb-5;18 
[a] familiar canon ofstatutory construction, ho~ever, is that 
when a statute fails to change the prevailing judicial construction 
of some prior enacted provision, that failure constitutes an im­
plied endorsement of judicial interpretation, at least to the extent 
that Congress was aware of the construction and there was a nat­
ural opportunity for revision.19 That maxim applies to the 1984 
Act, a fortiori.20 
The promulgation of Rule lOb-5 by the SEC in 1948 was 
prompted by the need for a rule to stop the wrongful behavior of a 
corporate president in Boston. The president of the company was 
fraudulently misrepresenting the financial outlook of the company 
to shareholders and then purchasing their shares, having full knowl­
edge that the company was in fact doing very well.21 The SEC 
14. Thel, supra note 13, at 385-86. The author comes to this conclusion by exam­
ining "an extensive published record of congressional and popular debate over stock 
exchange legislation .... together with documents left by those who wrote the Exchange 
Act." Id. at 385. 
15. Dooley, supra note 13. 
16. Id. at 59. 
17. Donald C. Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of1984 and Its Ef­
fect on Existing Law, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1274 (1984). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 1273 (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 385-87 
(1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 382 n.66 
(1982); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,580-81 (1978); see also 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES 
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.09 (4th ed. 1973». 
20. Id. at 1274. 
21. Milton V. Freeman, then a commissioner of the SEC explains the story be­
hind the creation of Rule lOb-5: 
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quickly adopted Rule lOb-5 to combat this and similar types of 
behavior. 
It is unclear that the intention of section lO(b) was to fight in­
sider trading. However, it is evident, that Rule lOb-5, promulgated 
under section lO(b), was adopted with that purpose in mind, and 
has been used. to battle insider trading ever since. 
B. Traditional Theory of Insider Trading Liability 
The traditional or classic theory of insider trading liability as 
envisioned by the Supreme Court22 finds its roots in two cases, 
Chiarella v. United States23 and Dirks v. SEC.24 According to the 
It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was sitting in my office in the 
S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who was 
then the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have just 
been on the telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Regional 
Administrator in Boston, "and he has told me about the president of some 
company in Boston who is going around buying up the stock of his company 
from his own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that 
the company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be 
quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there anything 
we can do about it?" So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I 
looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together, 
and the only discussion we had there was where "in connection with the 
purchase or sale". should be, and we decided it should be at the end. 
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't re­
member whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece 
of paper around to all the commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule 
and they tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything 
except Sumner Pike who said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't 
we?" That is how it happened. 
Milton V. Freeman, Remarks at the Meeting of the A.B.A. Section of Corporation, 
Banking and Business Law, reprinted in Conference on Codification of the Federal Se­
curities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967). 
22. Prior to any Supreme Court cases on the topic, the traditional or classic the­
ory had its beginnings in Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), and SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
23. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Chiarella was a markup man for a financial printer. His 
employer prepared soliciting materials for bidders in tender offers. Chiarella was able 
to break the company codes for the material to be printed and he discovered who the 
target companies were. He purchased shares in the target companies before the bid 
was made public. The announcement of the bid increased the price of shares, and 
Chiarella sold his shares for a profit. Chia·rella was convicted under Rule 10b-5. United 
States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 
445 U.S. 222 (1980). This conviction was affirmed by the Second Circuit. United States 
v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). The Supreme 
Court of the United States reversed the conviction, finding no fiduciary duty between 
Chiarella and the companies whose stock he had traded. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 237. 
24. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Dirks was an investment analyst. He received informa­
tion from a former employee of Equity Funding of America that Equity Funding was 
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classic theory, "a person violates Rule lOb-S by trading on material 
nonpublic information without disclosing that information to the 
marketplace - the essence of the abstain or disclose theory - if 
(and presumably only if) he owes a fiduciary duty to marketplace 
traders [buyers and sellers of the securities involved in the wrongful 
trade]."25 
In Chiarella, the Supreme Court of the United States held that 
"one who fails to disclose material information prior to the consum­
mation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty 
to do SO."26 The duty the Court is referring to is "[t]he obligation to 
disclose or abstain" from trading,27 which comes from Cady, Rob­
erts & CO.28 The disclose-or-abstain duty, or the Cady, Roberts 
rule, holds that one in possession of confidential, nonpublic infor­
mation must either abstain from trading on the information or 
make the information available to the marketplace before trading.29 
In Cady, Roberts the Securities and Exchange Commission deter­
mined that: 
[a]n affirmative duty to disclose material information has been 
being fraudulently managed and that its assets had been grossly overstated. The em­
ployee wanted Dirks to expose the fraud and Dirks succeeded in pUblicizing the infor­
mation. However, before publication Dirks told some of his clients to sell their shares 
\ 	 in Equity Funding. The SEC instituted an administrative proceeding against Dirks. 
Dirks, Release No. 17,480,21 SEC Doc. 1401 (Jan. 22, 1981). The SEC suggested adop­
tion of a theory under which the tippee of the confidential information "stands in the 
shoes" of the tipper, and assumes the tipper's duty not to misuse the information to his 
or her own advantage. The Commission's finding that Dirks had violated Rule lOb-5 
was affirmed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 
824, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court reversed, reiterating its position from 
Chiarella, that a fiduciary duty must exist from the defendant to one or more market­
place traders to establish Rule lOb-5 liability. Dirks was not liable because he did not 
benefit personally from the trading on the inside information. 
See Robert B. TItus & Peter G. Carroll, Netting the Outsider: The Need for a 
Broader Restatement of Insider Trading Doctrine, 8 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 127 (1986) 
for a discussion of the development of the traditional or classic theory. 
25. DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, § 1.03(1)(a) at 
18 (1991). 
26. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228. The Court held that the disclose-or-abstain duty 
only arises when a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence exists. 
Possession and use of inside information giving one an advantage over other market 
participants is not enough to trigger Rule 10b-5 liability. Id. at 228-29. 
27. Id. at 227. 
28. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). In Cady, Roberts & Co., the SEC imposed sanctions 
against a broker who, upon receiving "confidential, nonpublic information" about a 
reduction in the dividends of a publicly traded security, told his clients to sell their 
holdings. The Commission held that the broker's behavior was in violation of Rule 10b­
5 "as a practice which operated as a fraud or deceit upon the purchasers." Id. at 913. 
29. Id. at 912-13. 
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traditionally imposed on corporate "insiders," particularly of­
ficers, directors, or controlling stockholders. We, and the courts 
have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts 
which are known to them by virtue of their position but which 
are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if 
known, would affect their investment judgment.3o 
In Chiarella, the Supreme Court determined that the Cady, 
Roberts "duty to disclose arises when one party has information 
'that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or 
other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.' "31 
Thus, those who are found not to have a fiduciary relationship to 
either the buyer or seller of stocks are free to trade for personal 
benefit, even though they possess confidential, inside information. 
The duty to disclose does not arise "from mere possession of non­
public market information;" there must be a special relationship be­
tween the person possessing the inside information and the buyer 
or seller of the securities giving rise to the duty.32 The Court in 
Chiarella reversed the convictions, holding that Chiarella was not 
an insider because he received no confidential information from the 
companies whose stocks he purchased, and thus he owed no duty to 
the stockholders of these corporations.33 
If a fiduciary relationship is found between the person who 
trades on the inside information and the stockholders of the corpo­
ration on which the person has traded, there is a breach of the fidu­
ciary duty and Rule lOb-5 liability may attach.34 This traditional or 
classic theory enunciated in Chiarella serves an important function 
in the war against insider trading. However, in order to bring more 
activity under the insider trading umbrella, such as trading by tip­
pees35 and remote tippees,36 there was a need to enlarge the 
Chiarella formula. The traditional theory was expanded three years 
30. Id. at 911 (discussing the disclosure aspect of the disclose-or-abstain duty). 
31. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 551(2)(a) (1976)). 
32. Id. at 235. 
33. [d. at 231-35. The Court rejected the "equal access" theory from Cady, Rob­
erts which states that anyone with inside information owes a general duty to disclose-or­
abstain not just to the stockholders of the corporation being traded, but to the entire 
marketplace. According to the theory, liability is based on unfairness to the market and 
all traders should have "equal access" to information. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. 
34. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228-29. 
35. "Tippee" is defined as any person "who receive[s] material nonpublic infor­
mation from a corporate insider [and] may, under certain circumstances, be subject to 
abstain or disclose liability under Rule 10b-5." LANGEVOORT, supra note 25, § 4.01 at 
101 (1991). 
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later in Dirks v. SEC,37 when the Court illuminated the problem of 
tippee liability.38 
C. Tippee Liability 
The liability of the tippee39 is based upon the tipper's breach of 
a fiduciary duty. The Chiarella Court stated, "[t]he tippee's obliga­
tion has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after 
the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty."40 For the tippee 
to be liable, the tipper must have committed a wrongful act by dis­
closing the inside information to the tippee. 
The concept of tippee liability was clarified in Dirks v. SEC.41 
The Dirks Court announced a test to determine tippee liability.42 
A tippee will only be held liable if: (1) the insider (tipper) 
breached a fiduciary duty and (2) the outsider (tippee) knew or 
should have known about the tipper's breach.43 In effect, Dirks 
made the extension of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability to tip­
pees more practical by enunciating an applicable rule. 
Under the Dirks test, to find the insider, and thus the outsider, 
liable for a breach of a fiduciary duty, there must be a personal 
benefit to the insider from the disclosure.44 In Dirks, the Court 
found no such personal benefit or gain from the breach; therefore, 
36. A remote tippee is anyone who obtains confidential inside information from a 
tippee beyond the original tip by the insider. See id. at § 4.04(3). 
37. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
38. Id. at 655-67. 
39. . See supra note 35 for definition of tippee. 
40. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980). 
41. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). See supra note 24 for the facts of Dirks. 
42. Id. at 660. The Court stated: 

Thus, the test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indi­

rectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no 

breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no 
derivative breach. . . . This requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e., 
whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the dis­
closure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate 
into future earnings . . . . There are objective facts and circumstances that 
often justify such an inference. For example, there may be a relationship be­
tween the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the lat­
ter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient. The elements of 
fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an 
insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend. 
The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of 
the profits to the recipient. 
Id. at 662-64 (citations omitted); see LANGEVOORT, supra note 25, § 4.01-04. 
43. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. 
44. See supra note 42. 
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no liability attached to either the insider or his tippee.45 Mere pos­
session of the inside information is not enough, tippees are only 
derivatively liable if the information "has been made available to 
them improperly" by breach of a fiduciary duty by the insider to the 
shareholders.46 
Dirks built upon the Chiarella v. United States47 decision by 
following the Court's "requirement of a specific relationship be­
tween the shareholders and the individual trading on inside infor­
mation."48 However, the Dirks Court expanded this rule to allow a 
tippee to derive a disclose-or-abstain duty to the corporation's 
shareholders even when no specific relationship exists between the 
tippee and the shareholder. The Court recognized that "the tip­
pee's duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the in­
sider's duty."49 As to the tippee, the Court held that 
a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corpor­
ation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when 
the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by 
disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or 
should know that there has been a breach.5o 
When a tippee relays the information to another outsider, the 
original tippee becomes, in a sense, a tipper and the one receiving 
the information is referred to as a remote tippee.51 According to 
the chain theory of remote tippees, a tippee with a derivative fiduci­
ary duty is capable of bringing others into the scheme beyond the 
intent or awareness of the original insider.52 The chain theory cre­
ates a chain of persons with a duty to disclose, provided it can be 
proven that each person in the chain 
(1) was given the information expressly for the purpose of facili­
tating trading based on inside information, (2) knew that the in­
formation was material and not public, and (3) knew or had 
45. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667. Dirks received no personal gain from the disclosure; 
he was just trying to publicize the fraud of Equity Funding. Thus, the Court found no 
breach of a fiduciary duty. This case is the exception to the rule. See supra note 42 for 
the minimal requirements to be satisfied as to personal gain. Usually it is very easy to 
find personal benefit or gain on the part of the insider. Courts require as little as an 
increase in reputation, or the good feeling one gets from helping a friend. 
46. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. 
47. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
48. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655. 
49. Id. at 659. 
50. Id. at 660. 
51. See supra note 36 for a definition of remote tippee. 
52. LANGEVOORT, supra note 25, § 4.04 at 124-25. 
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reason to know that it came to him as a result of some breach of 
duty by an insider.53 
However, even with the expansion of insider trading prosecu­
tions under the Dirks theory, courts were having difficulty regulat­
ing certain behavior that appeared to be culpable, but did not fit· 
within the Chiarella-Dirks formula. This predicament led the Sec­
ond Circuit to adopt the misappropriation theory.54 
D. Misappropriation Theory 
The misappropriation theory provides that a Rule 10b-S viola­
tion occurs "when a person (1) misappropriates material nonpublic 
information (2) by breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of 
trust and confidence and (3) uses that information in a securities 
transaction, (4) regardless of whether he owed any duties to the 
shareholders of the traded stock."55 The misappropriation theory 
had its beginnings in a dissent by Chief Justice Burger in Chiarella 
v. United States .56 Chief Justice Burger believed that section 10(b) 
and Rule lOb-S liability should have attached to the defendant and 
stated that Chiarella "misappropriated-stole to put it bluntly­
valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost 
confidence."57 
The Second Circuit took the Chief Justice's lead and put the 
misappropriation theory into effect.58 Focusing on the language 
"fraud or deceit upon any person" from the text of Rule lOb-5,59 
the Second Circuit held that the "fraud and deceit" may be perpe­
trated on the source of the nonpublic information, even though the 
53. Id. 
54. See, e.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 
1053 (1985). 
55. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990). See Robert B. Titus & Peter 
G. Carroll, supra note 24, at 127 for a discussion of the development of the misappro­
priation theory. 
56. 445 U.S. 222, 239-45 (1980) (Burger, c.J., dissenting). 
57. Id. at 245; see Mark A. Clayton, Comment, The Misappropriation Theory in 
Light of Carpenter and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 
1988, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 192 (1989) ("Although criticized, Chief Justice Burger's 
dissenting opinion stimulated the development of the misappropriation theory." Id. 
(footnote omitted)). 
58. The misappropriation theory was first applied in the cases United States v. 
Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 13 (2d Cir. 1981), affd, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 863 (1983) and SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 
U.S. 1053 (1985). 
59. See supra note 2 for the text of Rule 10b-5. 
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source may be unconnected to the buyer or seller of the securities.60 
Thus, unlike the traditional theory of insider trading liability, also 
known as the disclose-or-abstain theory, under the misappropria­
tion theory, the fraud is not premised upon a duty to disclose to the 
shareholders of the traded stock or abstain from trading; "[i]nstead, 
the [Second Circuit in SEC v. Materia61 ] found that the misappro­
priation of confidential information which defrauds the source [in­
sider] satisfies Rule 10b-5's requirement that the fraud operate 'on 
any person.' "62 "These holdings were consistent with the language 
of Rule 10b-5, which contains no specific requirement that fraud be 
perpetrated upon the seller or buyer of securities. "63 Thus, under 
the misappropriation theory, it is not necessary for the fraud to be 
against the buyer or seller of securities; just so long as there is fraud 
perpetrated against the source [insider] of the inside information, a 
breach exists under Rule 10b-5. 
The misappropriation theory has applications in the cases of 
remote tippees64 also. Most courts that have treated the issue of 
remote tippees under the misappropriation theory have applied the 
same approach the Dirks Court used under the disclose-or-abstain 
theory.65 "[O]utsiders who participate with a fiduciary in a 'co-ven­
ture' to breach a duty are held responsible for all the consequences 
flowing therefrom as if they were fiduciaries themselves."66 Thus, 
tippees are treated as inheriting a derivative fiduciary duty from the 
tipper, whether under the misappropriation or classic theory; "the 
only difference is that under the misappropriation theory the tippee 
is part of a fraud on the source [insider] of the information, rather 
than any marketplace traders."67 
The Second Circuit has applied the misappropriation theory in 
the employment relations context only, involving situations in 
which an employee has misappropriated information from an em­
60. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484 
U.S. 19 (1987); see also United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). 
61. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984). 
62. Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trad­
ing Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 179,200 (1991) (footnote omitted). 
63. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981). See supra note 2 for 
the text of Rule lOb-5. 
64. See supra note 36 and accompanying text for a definition and discussion of 
remote tippees. 
65. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). 
66. LANGEVOORT, supra note 25, § 6.07 at 197. 
67. Id. at 197-98. 
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ployer.68 However, district courts in the Second Circuit have ex­
tended the theory to non-employment relationships.69 
Since the Chiarella decision, United States v. Carpenter70 is the 
only case in which the Supreme Court of the United States has 
dealt with the misappropriation theory. The securities fraud con­
victions brought pursuant to the misappropriation theory were af­
firmed by an evenly divided CourU1 Since an affirmance by an 
evenly divided court is "[not] entitled to precedential weight,"72 it is 
not clear whether the Supreme. Court endorses the misappropria­
tion theory.73 There is some evidence that the Supreme Court may 
have, at least tacitly, through dicta, endorsed the misappropriation 
theory in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner.74 The Sec­
ond Circuit noted that three other circuits have adopted the misap­
propriation theoryJ5 
68. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992); see United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (finding breach of duty by financial columnist to employer newspaper), affd 
by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197,202 (2d 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985) (finding breach of duty by copyholder to 
employer printing company); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981), 
affd, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983) (finding breach of duty by 
investment banker to employer firm). 
69. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566; see, e.g., United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying motion to dismiss where psychiatrist's breach of duty arising 
from confidential relationship between psychiatrist and patient resulted in psychiatrist 
performing trades based on information obtained from patient); United States v. Reed, 
601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.) (denying motion to dismiss where son allegedly breached 
fiduciary duty to his father, a corporate director), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 
(2d Cir. 1985); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (office services man­
ager breached duty to employer law firm and its clients by trading on inside information 
obtained while in course of his employment). 
70. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affd by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 19 
(1987). In Carpenter, Foster Winans, a columnist for the Wall Street Journal, along with 
some of his tippees, traded on inside information Winans had obtained for a column 
containing stock market tips. Id. at 1026. 
71. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24. 
72. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972) (citing Ohio ex rei. Eaton v. Price, 
364 U.S. 263,264 (1960». 
73. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 n.3 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992) for an indication whether the Supreme Court has 
endorsed the misappropriation theory. 
74. 472 U.S. 299 (1985). "We also have noted that a tippee may be liable if he 
otherwise 'misappropriate[s] or illegally obtain[s] the information.'" Id. at 313, n.22 
(citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983». 
75. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566; see, e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 404 (7th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir. 
1990); Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds 
after remand, 808 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987). 
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Although the Supreme Court has not clearly endorsed the mis­
appropriation theory,76 it enjoys continued use throughout a 
number of the circuits,77 including the Second Circuit in United 
States v. Chestman.78 
II. UNITED STATES V. CHESTMAN79 
A. Facts 
Chestman centers around the takeover of the Waldbaum Cor­
poration ("Waldbaum") by the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea 
Company ("A & P"). Waldbaum was a publicly traded company. 
Robert Chestman was Keith Loeb's stockbroker. Keith Loeb's 
wife, Susan, was the granddaughter of Julia Waldbaum. Julia 
Waldbaum was a member of the board of directors of Waldbaum, 
Inc., and the wife of its founder.80 In November of 1986, Julia's son, 
Ira Waldbaum, president and controlling shareholder of Waldbaum, 
agreed to sell Waldbaum to A & P. The purchase called for Ira to 
tender a controlling block of shares of Waldbaum to A & P, at a 
higher than market price.81 
Ira told some family members about the pending sale, warning 
them to keep it quiet until it went public. Among those whom Ira 
told was his sister, Shirley Witkin. Shirley did not intend to tell 
Susan, her daughter, about the sale, but was forced to due to un­
foreseeable circumstances.82 
Susan was concerned for her mother's health when she was not 
at home on a certain day. To dispel Susan's fears, Shirley disre­
garded her brother's order, and told her daughter she was not at 
home because she had to get her shares to Ira so he could tender 
them for her.83 Shirley warned Susan not to disclose this fact to 
anyone but her husband. Susan told her husband, Keith Loeb, 
about the sale and warned him not to say anything because "it 
could possibly ruin the sale."84 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 70-74 for a discussion of whether the 
Supreme Court has endorsed the misappropriation theory. 
77. See supra note 75 for a list of cases employing the misappropriation theory in 
the circuits. 
78. 947 F.2d at 564. 
79. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). 
80. Id. at 555. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 579. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
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Keith alleged he contacted his broker, Robert Chestman, on 
November 26, and told him about the sale. That same day, 
Chestman executed several purchases of Waldbaum stock, includ­
ing 1,000 shares for Keith Loeb's account.85 Chestman claimed he 
bought the stock based on his own independent research. He also 
denied having spoken to Keith Loeb on that day.86 Keith Loeb 
agreed to cooperate with the government. In so doing, Keith was 
required to disgorge the $2S,000 profit from the purchase and sale 
of the stock, and pay an additional $2S,000 fine.87 
On July 20, 1988 Chestman was indicted on thirty-one counts 
of insider trading and perjury, among these were ten counts of se­
curities fraud in violation of Rule 10b-S.88 At trial, a jury found 
Chestman guilty on all counts.89 On appeal, a panel of the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the' convictions on all thirty-one 
counts.90 The court held that a fiduciary duty did not exist as re­
quired under Rule 10b-S.91 The Second Circuit reheard the case en 
banc and upheld the reversal of the Rule lOb-S convictions.92 The 
Supreme Court of the United States denied the case further 
review.93 
B. Majority Opinion94 
Robert Chestman's Rule 10b-S convictions were based on the 
misappropriation theory.95 Chestman was convicted as the tippee 
of Keith Loeb. Thus, Keith Loeb was the alleged misappropriator 
of the nonpublic information. For this reason, the court's analysis 
focuses on the existence or non-existence of a fiduciary relationship 
85. Id. at 555. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 556. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75, 84-86 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated, 947 
F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane) (holding that the evidence did not support a convic­
tion), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). 
91. See infra text accompanying notes 94-119 discussing the en bane opinion in 
Chestman, which upheld the finding of the panel, that a fiduciary duty did not exist. 
92. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). The court affirmed the convictions in violation of section 
14(e) and Rule 14e-3(a), reversed the convictions of mail fraud, and did not consider 
the perjury conviction. Id. 
93. Chestman v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). 
94. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). 
95. See id. at 564. See supra text accompanying notes 55-78 for a discussion of 
the misappropriation theory. 
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between Keith Loeb and either his wife Susan, or between Keith 
and the Waldbaum family.96 
The en banc opinion centered around the meaning of a fiduci­
ary duty. The court asked the question, "what constitutes a fiduci­
ary or similar relationship of trust and confidence in the context of 
Rule lOb-5 criminalliability?"97 The court made clear that a fiduci­
ary duty cannot be imposed on an insider for merely being en­
trusted with confidential information.98 Relying on its decision in 
Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co. ,99 the court concluded that 
"[r]eposing confidential information in another, then, does not by 
itself create a fiduciary relationship."I°O 
As to the family relationship involved, the court went on to 
find that "marriage does not, without more, create a fiduciary rela­
tionship."IOI Citing United States v. Reed,lfJ2 the court acknowl­
edged that" 'mere kinship does not of itself establish a confidential 
relation.' . . . Rather, the existence of a confidential relationship 
must be determined independently of a preexisting family relation­
ship."103 The court recognized that under certain circumstances 
spouses may become fiduciaries, however, "the marriage relation­
ship alone does not impose fiduciary status."I04 
Concluding that the relationships between Keith and Susan 
96. See id. at 570-71. 
97. Id. at 567. See note 31 and accompanying text for the source of the phrase 
being interpreted by the Chestman court. 
98. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567 (referring to Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 
F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying Delaware law». In the Walton case, Morgan 
Stanley was an investment bank that obtained confidential material concerning possible 
takeover targets for one of its clients. The material was obtained from Olinkraft, one of 
the targets. Walton, 623 F.2d at 797. When the planned takeover was abandoned by its 
client, Morgan Stanley was charged with trading on the Olinkraft stock, based on the 
confidential information. Id. at 797-98. The Second Circuit found that Morgan Stanley 
in fact owed Olinkraft no fiduciary duty. Id. at 799. Although Olinkraft gave the infor­
mation to Morgan Stanley intending that they keep it confidential, Morgan Stanley was 
under no duty to do so. Id. 
99. 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980). 
100. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568. 
101. Id. 
102. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 
1985). Reed involved the passing of inside information from a father to his son. The 
father, the corporate director of a company, was designated the insider while the son 
was the one to whom the information was tipped. Id. 
103. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568 (citing Reed,. 601 F. Supp. at 706 (quoting 
GEORGE G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 482, at 300-11 (rev. 2d ed. 
1978))) (other citations omitted). 
104. Id. The court did not elaborate as to what circumstances may give rise to 
spouses being considered fiduciaries. 
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and between Keith and the Waldbaum family were not fiduciary, 
the court inquired whether a "similar relationship of trust and con­
fidence" existed under Rule lOb-S. loS The court reasoned that the 
word "similar" suggested that a relationship of trust and confidence 
must have the same characteristics as a fiduciary relationship.l06 
The court claimed that to ignore the significance of the word "simi­
lar" would leave the possible interpretations of a relationship of 
trust and confidence too expansive. The court noted that this inter­
pretation would bring it back to the standard rejected in Walton v. 
Morgan Stanley & Co. :107 that the mere possession of c,onfidential 
information could result in Rule lOb-5 liability. lOS The court con­
cluded, "[ a] 'similar relationship of trust and confidence,' therefore, 
must be the functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship."109 
In examining whether a similar relationship of trust or confi­
dence existed, the court inquired into the characteristics of a fiduci­
ary relationship. According to the court, "[a] fiduciary relationship 
involves discretionary authority and dependency: One person de­
pends on another-the fiduciary-to serve his interests. "110 
The Chestman court distinguished United States v. Reedl11 
from the facts before it.112 Without such a distinction, Reed could 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980). 
108. Id. See supra note 98 and accompanying text for a discussion of Walton. 
109. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568. 
110. Id. at 569. The court explained: 
In relying on a fiduciary to act for his benefit, the beneficiary of the relation 
may entrust the fiduciary with custody over property of one sort or another. 
Because the fiduciary obtains access to this property to serve the ends of the 
fiduciary relationship, he becomes duty-bound not to appropriate the property 
for his own use. What has been said of an agent's duty of confidentiality ap­
plies with equal force to other fiduciary relations: "an agent is subject to a 
duty to the principal not to use or to communicate information confidentially 
given him by the principal or acquired by him during the course of or on ac­
count of his agency." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958). 
These characteristics represent the measure of the paradigmatic fiduciary rela­
tionship. A similar relationship of trust and confidence consequently must 
share these qualities. 
Id. 
111. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 
1985). 
112. 947 F.2d at 569. Both Reed and Chestman involve insider trading tippee 
liability in the family relationship context. Since the district court in Reed had found 
that a fiduciary relationship did exist between the father and son, the Second Circuit in 
Chestman distinguished the Reed holding, because the court found no such relationship 
present in Chestman. Id. at 570. 
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be interpreted as lending support to the finding of a fiduciary or 
similar relationship of trust and confidence in all situations involv­
ing family relationships. Instead, the Chestman court chose to limit 
Reed to its essential holding: 
[T]he repeated disclosure of business secrets between family 
members may substitute for a factual finding of dependence and 
influence and thereby sustain a finding of the functional 
equivalent of a fiduciary relationship. We note, in this regard, 
that Reed repeatedly emphasized that the father and son "fre­
quently discussed business affairs. "113 
The Chestman court recognized that "equity has occasionally 
established a less rigorous threshold for a fiduciary-like relation­
ship[,]"114 but declined to do so, observing that "[u]seful as such an 
elastic and expedient definition of confidential relations, i.e., rela­
tions of trust and confidence, may be in the civil context, it has no 
place in the criminallaw."115 The court concluded that to apply an 
equity standard "for determining the presence of criminal fraud 
would offend not only the rule of lenity but due process as well."116 
The court applied its interpretation of the fiduciary duty law to 
the facts of the case. The government needed to prove two ele­
ments: (1) Keith Loeb breached a fiduciary duty to Susan or to the 
Waldbaum family and (2) Robert Chestman knew that Loeb had 
done SO.117 On the first element, the court found the evidence was 
insufficient to show that a "fiduciary relationship or its functional 
equivalent" existed between Loeb and the Waldbaum family or be­
tween Loeb and Susan.118 Alternatively, the court held that the 
government failed to meet its burden in proving the second element 
that Chestman knew or should have known about the breach of 
113. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569 (quoting Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 690); see also Reed, 
601 F. Supp. at 705, 709, 717-18. 
114. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569. 
115. Id. at 570. 
116. Id.; see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 n.20 (1980). The 
Chestman court recognized "that equity has occasionally established a less rigorous 
threshold for a fiduciary-like relationship in order to right civil wrongs." Chestman, 947 
F.2d at 569. The court also observed that equity has tended to invoke the confidential 
relation doctrine "whenever ... a suitable occasion has arisen." Id. (quoting United 
States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685,712 n.38 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting GEORGE G. Bo­
GERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 482, at 284-86)). Despite the previous use 
of this test, the Second Circuit in Chestman refused to apply the "suitable occasion" 
test, claiming it had no place in the criminal law. Id. at 570. 
117. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 570. 
118. Id. at 570-71. 
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fiduciary duty.119 
C. Dissenting Opinion 120 
Judge Winter found the best way to understand the Supreme 
Court's decisions in insider trading cases was in terms of a "busi­
ness-property" rationale:121 
Information is perhaps the most precious commodity in commer­
cial markets. It is expensive to produce, and, because it involves 
facts and ideas that can be easily photocopied or carried in one's 
head, there is a ubiquitous risk that those who pay to produce 
information will see others reap the profit from it.122 
In applying this analysis to the family-controlled corporation 
context, Judge Winter concluded "that family members who have 
benefitted from the family's control of the corporation are under a 
duty not to disclose confidential corporate information that comes 
to them in the ordinary course of family affairs."l23 
Judge Winter proposed a test to apply to the family relation­
ship in the family-controlled corporation context to find a fiduciary 
relationship as required by section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5: 
I thus believe that a family member (i) who has received or ex­
pects (e.g., through inheritance) benefits from family control of a 
corporation, here gifts of stock, (ii) who is in a position to learn 
confidential corporate information through ordinary family inter­
actions, and (iii) who knows that under the circumstances both 
the corporation and the family desire confidentiality, has a duty 
not to use information so obtained for personal profit where the 
use risks disclosure.124 
In applying his test to the facts of Chestman, Judge Winter found 
that the relationship between Keith Loeb and Susan Loeb and be­
tween Keith Loeb and the Waldbaum family met the requirements 
119. Id. at 570. The second requirement, that the tippee knew or had reason to 
know, has not been entirely consistent in its application. Sometimes the standard ap­
pears to be something closer to actual knowledge than "reason to know." Compare 
SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 434-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) with SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 
197, 202 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985). See Groskaufmanis, supra 
note 10, at 19 for a proposition that the Chestman court changed the standard to actual 
knowledge. 
120. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571 (Winter, J., dissenting). 
121. Id. at 576; see Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Eviden­
tiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. Cr. REV. 309-39. 
122. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 576-77 (citing Easterbrook, supra note 121, at 313). 
123. Id. at 579. 
124. Id. at 580. 
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and would result in the finding of a fiduciary duty and liability 
under Rule lOb-S. I25 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Fiduciary v. Trust and Confidence: Is There a Distinction? 
A fiduciary relationship is a relationship that has been given 
special status by the law. In such relationships the law imposes a 
fiduciary duty on persons with certain legal relationships to one an­
other regardless of their factual relationship.126 Whereas trust and 
confidence relations depend on the facts of a situation and are 
found only if there is an actual relationship of dependence between 
the parties despite the absence of any formal legal relationship that 
would qualify as a fiduciary relationship.127 
The court in Chestman incorrectly concluded that there is no 
distinction between a fiduciary relation and a relation of trust and 
confidence. l28 It states that "[a] 'similar relationship of trust and 
confidence,' therefore, must be the functional equivalent of a fidu­
ciary relationship."129 The court's conclusion turns on the use of 
the word "similar" in the phrase being interpreted.130 As discussed 
earlier, the phrase "fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and 
confidence" can be traced back to the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts. 131 The problem is that somewhere between Chiarella and 
Chestman the configuration of this phrase changed. In Chiarella 
the phrase was "fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and con­
fidence,"132 while in Chestman the phrase was "fiduciary duty or 
similar relationship of trust and confidence."133 Somewhere be­
tween the two cases, the word "other" mysteriously disappeared 
from the phrase. Although Chiarella dealt with the classic theory 
and Chestman dealt with the misappropriation theory, Chiarella, by 
way of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, is the source of the 
phrase, and courts have applied the phrase in cases dealing with 
125. Id. at 580-81. 
126. GEORGE G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 481, at 225 
(rev. 2d ed. 1978). 
127. Id. § 482, at 280. 
128. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568. 
129. Id. 
130. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100 for the Chestman court's analysis 
of a fiduciary duty. 
131. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
132. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (emphasis added) (quot­
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)). 
133. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566. 
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both the classic and misappropriation theories.134 
Once the word "other" is reintroduced, the phrase "fiduciary 
or other similar relation of trust and confidence"135 is open to new 
interpretations. The use of the word "other" suggests that there is a 
distinction between fiduciary and trust and confidence relations. 
The phrase could be interpreted to mean that if trust and confi­
dence relations have the same characteristics as fiduciary relations 
then it would follow that all fiduciary relations could be considered 
of trust and confidence. However, because of the special designa­
tion of fiduciary relations, not all trust and confidence relations can 
be called fiduciary.B6 The Chestman interpretation creates a prob­
lem because it would be redundant for the Restatement to use both 
terms, fiduciary and trust and confidence, if they have the same 
meaning. If fiduciary and trust and confidence are truly functional 
equivalents, it is both repetitive and confusing to use both terms. If 
indeed they are synonymous, it would add nothing to the Restate­
ment rule to have the term trust and confidence even mentioned. 
When the Chestman court erroneously concluded that mar­
riage alone fails to create a fiduciary relationship, it relied primarily 
on a quote from United States v. Reed.137 "'[M]ere kinship does not 
of itself establish a confidential relation.' Rather, the existence of a 
confidential relationship must be determined independently of a 
preexisting family relationship."138 
The Reed court's authority in concluding that a family relation 
is not fiduciary in nature was G.G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and 
Trustees .139 When the court quotes from Bogert, it purports to be 
discussing fiduciary duties, but the quote actually comes from Sec­
tion 482, titled "Abuse of Confidential Relationship," which dis­
cusses trust and confidence relations.14o Section 481 from Bogert is 
the section that discusses fiduciary obligations.141 Thus, even 
134. See, e.g., Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567. 
135. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 551(2)(a) (1976». 
136. This interpretation comports with some of the distinctions that have been 
suggested by previous courts. See infra text accompanying notes 137-61. 
137. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568 (citing United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 
706 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985». 
138. Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 706 (citations omitted) (quoting BOGERT, supra note 
126, § 482 at 300-11). 
139. See id. 
140. Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 706 (discussing BOGERT, supra note 126) (emphasis 
added). 
141. BOGERT, supra note 126, § 481 at 225 (this section is titled, "Breach of a 
Fiduciary Obligation"). 
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before reaching the discussion of trust and confidence relations,142 
the court uses a quote discussing confidential relations to determine 
that a fiduciary relation fails to exist. The court's muddled analysis 
demonstrates the confusion which exists in dealing with the terms 
fiduciary and confidential. It also shows that the Second Circuit 
was operating under the presupposition that a distinction between 
the terms "fiduciary" and "confidential" did not exist, and thus, was 
unable to keep their definitions separate and distinct. 
Even Bogert recognizes that a distinction between fiduciary 
and confidential relations exists. Bogert points out that "[i]n many 
decisions the words [fiduciary relation and confidential relation] are 
used as synonyms."143 Bogert goes on to say, "[i]n most cases, how­
ever, the latter phrase [confidential relation] is employed to indi­
cate a relationship of a character similar to ... fiduciary relations, 
but not falling into any well-defined category of the law."l44 Bogert 
cites two cases that help delineate this distinction.145 
The court in Roberts v. Parsons l46 held that a distinction be­
tween a fiduciary and confidential relation does exist.147 The court 
found that although some courts treat the two as synonymous, 
[t]here is, however, a technical distinction between the two terms, 
142. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). 
143. BOGERT, supra note 126, § 482 at 280. 
144. Id. Bogert continues: 

The relations of trustee and beneficiary, executor or administrator and credi­

tors, next of kin or legatees, guardian and ward, principal and agent, attorney 

and client, corporate director and corporation, and the like are easily placed 

into distinct subdivisions of the law. They have distinctive names. The term 

"fiduciary" might well be reserved for such relations. 

There are other cases where there is just as great intimacy, disclosure of 
secrets, entrusting of power, and superiority of position in the case of the rep­
resentative, but where the law has no special designation for the position of 
the parties. It cannot be called trust or executorship, and yet it is so similar in 
its creation and operation that it should have like results. 
Id. at 280-81. 
Bogert recognizes a distinction exists between fiduciary and confidential relations, 
and comments that where "great intimacy, disclosure of secrets, entrusting of power, 
and superiority of position" exist, it is a confidential relationship, and similar results as 
those in a fiduciary relation should occur upon a breach. Id. 
145. BOGERT, supra note 126, § 481 at 280-81 n.53 (citing Roberts v. Parsons, 242 
S.W. 594 (Ky. Ct. App. 1922); Oehler v. Hoffman, 113 N.W.2d 254 (Iowa 1962) (citing 
Richard S. Hudson, Contracts in Iowa Revisited-Fraud and Misrepresentation, Duress 
and Undue Influence, 9 DRAKE L. REv. 3 (1959))). 
146. 242 S.W. 594 (Ky. Ct. App. 1922) (invalidating and canceling deeds and con­
tracts between relatives in which a confidential relation existed). 
147. Id. at 596. 
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the former [fiduciary relation] being more correctly applicable 
to legal relationships between the parties . . . while the latter . 
[confidential relation] might include them and also every other 
relationship wherein confidence is rightfully reposed and is exer­
cised, among which, as we have seen, is superiority of knowledge 
on the part of the one seeking to uphold the contract and confi­
dence reposed in him by the other.148 
The court goes on to say, "it is not necessary that the relationship 
should be of that legal nature in order to raise one of trust and 
confidence, but that it may under certain circumstances exist be­
tween mere relatives ...."149 
The court in Oehler v. Hoffman 150 also recognizes the distinc­
tion between fiduciary and confidential relations. The court found 
that a confidential relation "may exist although there is no fiduciary 
relation. It exists when one person has gained the confidence of 
another and purports to act or advise with the other's interest in 
mind."151 The court concluded that a confidential relationship is 
embodied by "the presence of a dominant influence" that the one 
party has over the other.152 The Oehler court cites a Drake Law 
Review article,153 and Bogert also makes reference to it in his cita­
tion to Oehler.154 
The article cited by Oehler, "Contracts in Iowa Revisited­
Fraud and Misrepresentation, Duress and Undue Influence"155 rec­
ognizes the distinction. The author explained that Iowa courts had 
taken the position of treating confidential relationships covered by 
section 497 of the Restatement of Contracts in the same manner as 
fiduciary relationships referred to in section 498.156 Hudson made 
reference to the distinction between fiduciary and confidential, as 
illustrated in the Restatement of Contracts.157 Hudson correctly 
148.· Id. 
149. Id. (referring to JOHN W. SMITH, LAW OF FRAUD, § 23 (1907». See infra 
text accompanying notes 172-204 for a discussion of family relations as fiduciary or 
confidential. 
150. 113 N.W.2d 254 (Iowa 1962). The court found a confidential relation did not 
exist that would render a deed invalid. The relationship was between an elderly wo­
man, and a married couple that did her errands, and were friends with her. Id. 
151. Id. at 256. 
152. Id. 
153. Id.; see also Richard S. Hudson, Contracts in Iowa Revisited-Fraud and 
Misrepresentation, Duress and Undue Influence, 9 DRAKE L. REV. 3 (1959). 
154. See BOGERT, supra note 126, § 482 at 280-81 n.53. 
155. Hudson, supra note 153. 
156. See Hudson, supra note 153, at 14-15. 
157. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcrs §§ 497, 498, at 954-57 (1932). 
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identifies section 497 as covering confidential relationships, and sec­
tion 498 as covering fiduciary relationships. Comment a to section 
497 states: "[t)he relationships that ordinarily fall within the rule are 
those of parent and child, guardian and ward, husband and wife 
•••."158 This comment suggests that in order to determine if a 
confidential relationship exists, each relationship must be examined 
on a case-by-case basis. "[I)t is a question of fact whether the rela­
tionship in a particular case is such as to give one party dominance 
over the other, or put him in a position where words of persuasion 
have undue weight ...."159 
Thus, section 497 of the Restatement identifies a confidential 
relation as one characterized by domination or influence. Section 
498 covers fiduciary relationships. Comment a to section 498 states 
"[t)he rule is more severe than that applicable generally where 
there is a confidential relationship. "160 This may have to do with 
the fact that the law imposes a special duty on fiduciaries, and the 
consequences would be more severe if the fiduciary violated the 
obligation. Sections 497 and 498 make clear that the Restatement 
distinguishes fiduciary from confidential relationships, and com­
ment a to section 498 reinforces this distinction by making "the rule 
. . . more severe" if the relationship is fiduciary rather than 
confidential.161 
Given the preceding material, a fiduciary relation is viewed as 
a relationship, and consequently, a duty the law recognizes through 
158. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcrs § 497 cmt. a, at 954 (1932) (emphasis added). 
See infra text accompanying notes 172-204 for a discussion of marriage constituting a 
confidential relationship. 
159. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcrs § 497 cmt. a, at 955 (1932). 
160. Id. § 498 cmt. a (emphasis added). 
161. Id. This same distinction in the Restatement of Contracts is carried over in 
the Restatement of Contracts, Second. Section 177 in Restatement Second is based on 
former § 497. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 177 reporter's note 
(1979). Section 177 is essentially the same rule as § 497. Comment a to § 177 explains 
as follows: "[r]elations that often fall within the rule include those of parent and child, 
husband and wife, clergyman and parishioner, and physician and patient." RESTATE­
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 177 cmt. a (emphasis added). Notice that some of 
the relationships enumerated in former § 497 have been dropped, but that of husband 
and wife and parent and child have been kept intact. See supra text accompanying 
notes 172-204 for a discussion of family relations being fiduciary or confidential. 
Section 173 of Restatement Second of Contracts is based on former § 498. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 173 reporter's note (1979). Comment a 
highlights the distinction between fiduciary and confidential relationships; "[the fiduci­
ary rule] is more severe than the rule relating to non-disclosure in the case of one who 
stands in a relation of trust and confidence but who is not a fiduciary." Thus, the dis­
tinction enunciated in Restatement of Contracts continues to survive in the Restate­
ment of Contracts, Second. Id. at cmt. a. 
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certain enumerated relationships, such as trustee and beneficiary. 
Whereas, a confidential relation, born in equity, defies a precise 
definition, but is one where trust and confidence is reposed by one 
in another and is marked by reliance and control by the receiver of 
the information over the giver of the information~ There is a dis­
tinction between fiduciary and confidential, and for the Second Cir­
cuit to ignore it by claiming that a confidential relation is the 
functional equivalent of a fiduciary relation is to play fast and loose 
with the law in the area. The Second Circuit's analysis also ignores 
the intent both of the American Law Institute in drafting the Re­
statement (Second) of Torts and the Supreme Court, which adopted 
the Restatement definition in Chiarella v. United States .162 
In going to the very roots of the phrase, "fiduciary or other 
similar relation of trust and confidence,"163 it becomes apparent 
that a distinction between the two terms does exist. For courts to 
ignore one aspect of the analysis by claiming that it is the same as a 
separate part of analysis is to disregard the true meaning of the 
terms being used. The effect of such a tainted analysis is to create a 
loophole in the law of insider trading. Family members and their 
tippees involved in family-controlled corporations may evade the 
consequences of their wrongful conduct, unlike other market par­
ticipants engaging in similar behavior. To ignore the confidential 
relationship aspect of the analysis is to leave the inquiry incom­
plete. The result is this loophole in insider trading laws involving 
family-controlled corporations that ultimately leads to ineffective 
enforcement of insider trading laws. Although Judge Winter's pro­
posed rule164 could be used as a weapon against insider trading per­
petrated by family members of family-controlled corporations and 
their tippees, the rule may be too expansive and is also unnecessary. 
Judge Winter's intent was to plug the hole that the majority opinion 
created. While Judge Winter's rule may plug the hole effectively, it 
may also cause a backlash of water to sweep over the dam. In the 
words of Judge Miner, if the proposed rule were adopted "[t]he net 
would be spread wider than appropriate in a criminal context. "165 
Judge Miner is referring to the possibility that the proposed rule 
would sweep in family members undeserving of such treatment, 
162. 445 u.s. 222,228 (1980). 
163. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
164. See supra text accompanying note 124 for Judge Winter's proposed rule. 
165. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 582 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane) 
(Miner, J., concurring), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). 
1994] SECURITIES LAW-UNITED STATES v. CHESTMAN 103 
such as "minor children."l66 Aside from the possibility that the rule 
would bring in more people than it should, the rule is unnecessary. 
Judge Winter's intent was to create a test in order to identify 
certain relationships as fiduciary-at-Iaw. Judge Winter recognizes 
the problem created by the majority, but his solution is a judge­
made rule that is unnecessary when the answer can be found within 
the case law interpreting Rule lOb-So 
The courts need only look to the neglected analysis of trust and 
confidence relations to deal with the problem involving family-con­
trolled corporations. If the court were to use a case-by-case factual 
inquiry into the existence of a relationship of trust and confidence 
in addition to the usual search for a fiduciary relationship, Rule 
lOb-S would be more effective in the context of family-controlled 
corporations specifically, as well as prosecutions in general. 
The majority in Chestman refused to apply equity standards to 
the situation.167 An in depth inquiry into the law in the area would 
have revealed to the court that such a standard is not only proper, 
but required. The trust and confidence relationship comes from eq­
uity and has always been more flexible than the stricter fiduciary 
relationship analysis at law. It follows from the case law that the 
Supreme Court would not have adopted the phrase, "fiduciary or 
other similar relation of trust and confidence" from the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts in Chiarella V. United States l68 unless it intended 
that the phrase be used in its entirety. This includes an analysis of 
the existence of a relation of trust and confidence using equity stan­
dards under which it was established. 
In applying a trust and confidence relationship analysis to the 
facts of Chestman, the conclusion is reached that the relationship 
between Keith Loeb and his wife Susan was sufficient to support a 
finding of a confidential relationship. There was confidence and de­
pendence on the part of Keith over Susan when Susan disclosed the 
inside information to Keith. As the Chestman court indicated, the 
mere entrusting of information with another is not enough to create 
a fiduciary relationship.169 However, when this entrusting of infor­
mation is combined with other factors, it does create the existence 
of a relation of trust and confidence. One such factor is that both 
Susan and Keith were family members in a family-controlled corpo­
166. Id. at 583 (Miner, J., concurring). 
167. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's 
refusal to apply equity standards in Chestman. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569-70. 
168. 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980). 
169. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567. 
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ration setting. The family-controlled corporation element makes 
the family member's situation require more loyalty and confidence 
than in a normal family setting. 
The evidence also indicated that Keith and Susan had shared 
secrets in the past and these confidences were maintained pO This 
displays that their relationship was one where there was both confi­
dence and dependence. Also of significance was Susan's directive 
that Keith not disclose the information to anyone. This demon­
strates that there was also an element of reliance in Susan and 
Keith's relationship. Analyzing the facts of Chestman under a trust 
and confidence relationship standard demonstrates that the rela­
tionship between Susan and Keith was one of trust and confidence. 
The Chestman court was mistaken in looking only for a fiduci­
ary relationship or its functional equivalent. An examination of 
Chiarella v. United States l7l and the sources upon which it relied 
indicate that a distinction between fiduciary and trust and confi­
dence relations does exist, thereby demonstrating the need to per­
form a separate inquiry into the existence of a relation of trust and 
confidence. And because trust and confidence relations originate 
from an equity background, it is appropriate to use such a standard 
in performing a trust and confidence relation analysis. 
B. 	 An Analysis of Family Relationships as Either a Fiduciary or 
Similar Relation of Trust and Confidence 
The court in Chestman found it necessary not only to look for a 
fiduciary relationship, but also a similar relationship of trust and 
confidence as part of its lOb-5 inquiry.l72 The analysis of the Sec­
ond Circuit included this inquiry because when the Supreme Court 
first dealt with the insider trading issue in Chiarella,173 it deter­
mined that the disclose-or-abstain duty "arises when one [party] has 
information 'that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a 
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between 
them."'174 Because the Supreme Court chose to tie the disclose-or­
abstain duty to a "fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and 
170. 	 Id. at 579. 
171. 	 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
172. 	 Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568. 
173. 	 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
174. Id. at 228 (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 551(2)(a) (1976». See supra note 31 and accompanying text for the source of the 
phrase "fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence." 
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confidence,"175 anytime a question of Rule 10b-5 liability arises, the 
court must determine if either of these relationships is present. 
Since the heart of the court's analysis in Chestman 176 is an in­
quiry into the presence of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and 
confidence,177 it is important to understand what relationships these 
terms encompass. When the Supreme Court used the phrase "fidu­
ciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence" in 
Chiarella,178 it actually quoted from the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts,179 and included a reference to a law review article on 
misrepresentation.180 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 551 deals with 
"[l]iability for [n]ondisclosure."181 As can be seen from the text,182 
section 551(2)(a) suggests a duty to disclose when a fiduciary or 
similar relation of trust and confidence exists between the parties. 
Comment f on clause (a) lends some insight as to what constitutes a 
fiduciary or trust and confidence relation.183 The comment states: 
[m]embers of the same family normally stand in a fiduciary rela­
tion to one another, although it is of course obvious that the fact 
that two men are brothers does not establish relation of trust and 
confidence when they have become estranged and have not spo­
ken to one another for many years.l84 
The comment demonstrates that the original source of the 
phrase "fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confi­
dence"185 recognized that a family relation "normally" is fiduci­
175. Id. 
176. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. de­
nied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). 
177. Id. at 567. "[W]e tum to our central inquiry-what constitutes a fiduciary or 
similar relationship of trust and confidence in the context of Rule 10b-5 criminalliabil­
ity?" Id. 
178. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228. 
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976). 
180. Flemming James Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, Misrepresentation-Part II, 37 MD. L. 
REv. 488, 525 (1978). 
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976) states as follows: 
(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable 
care to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated, (a) mat­
ters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or 
other similar relation of trust and confidence between them. 
Id. 
182. See id. 
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) cmt. f (1976). 
184. Id. 
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976). 
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ary.186 A family relation may also be of trust and confidence, 
however, this depends on a factual inquiry. 
In the Reporter's Note for section 551 a case is cited as support 
for the comment; the case supports the premise that a family rela­
tionship is normally fiduciary or confidential.187 In the Enyart case, 
the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that even between a future 
husband and wife a confidential relationship existed.188 "It is also a 
well-established rule that, in view of the close and confidential rela­
tion existing between affianced persons, it is the duty of the pro­
spective husband to make a full and fair disclosure ...."189 This 
case lends further support for the Restatement's conclusion that a 
familial relationship is normally fiduciary or confidential. Despite 
this, the Chestman court determined that a husband-wife relation­
ship was not fiduciary, nor confidential.190 It is of significance that 
the Chestman court selectively relies on the authority of the Re­
statement, but refuses to accept all the ramifications of such 
reliance. 
The Restatement and the case it cites tend to contradict the 
authority cited by the Second Circuit in Chestman, which held that 
a family relation is not fiduciary.191 These authorities, in turn, lend 
support for finding a fiduciary relation among family members of a 
family-controlled corporation. This support is based on the fact 
that if family relations have been deemed fiduciary by past case law, 
it would follow that a family relation with an added element of a 
family-controlled corporation could support a finding of a fiduciary 
or similar relation of trust and confidence even more so than a sim­
ple family relationship. In fact, Judge Winter points out that it is 
this family-controlled corporation context that is so important to 
the analysis and that is entirely ignored by the majority opinion.192 
186. Id. at cmt. f. 
187. In re Enyart's Estate, 160 N.W. 120 (Neb. 1916), overruled in part by Kings­
ley v. Noble, 263 N.W. 222 (Neb. 1935). The court held that a future husband and wife 
stood in a confidential relation, which imposed a duty of full disclosure on the husband 
to tell of his true net worth before having his wife sign an antenuptial agreement. The 
court allowed the wife to cancel the agreement and receive what she was allowed under 
law because the husband failed to disclose such information. Id. 
188. Enyart, 160 N.W. at 120. 
189. Id. at 123 (emphasis added). 
190. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568-70 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). 
191. Id. at 568 ("Kinship alone does not create the necessary relationship." Id.) 
(citing United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685,706 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 
773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting BOGERT, supra note 126, § 482 at 300-11». 
192. Id. at 580 (Winter, J., dissenting). 
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Further support for the contention that a family relation is one 
of trust and confidence is found in the law review article cited by 
the Supreme Court in Chiarella.193 The James & Gray article on 
misrepresentation states that the duty to disclose "has been ex­
tended to relations of trust and confidence beyond technical 
trusts."194 In the footnote supporting this assertion, it says, 
"[m]embers of the same family often stand in such a relationship to 
each other that full disclosure is required, but this may be varied by 
circumstances."195 It seems to follow that in a family-controlled 
corporation context there is no need to vary the finding of a fiduci­
ary or similar relation of trust and confidence. In fact, it is this ad­
ded element which calls for the finding of a fiduciary or other 
similar relation of trust and confidence beyond that found in a nor­
mal family relationship. Thus, both sources cited by the Supreme 
Court in Chiarella for the proposition that a duty to disclose arises 
when "a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence" 
exists,196 lend support to the contention that a family relation may 
qualify as either fiduciary or confidential.197 
In Appeal of Darlington,198 a case cited by the James & Gray 
article, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania attempted to define a 
confidential relation, and in so doing listed some accepted 
examples. 
The confidential relation is not at all confined to any specific as­
sociation of the parties to it. While its more frequent illustrations 
are between persons who are related as trustee and cestui que 
trust, guardian and ward, attorney and client, parent and child, 
husband and wife, it embraces partners and copartners, principal 
and agent, master and servant, physician and patient, and gener­
193. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 n.9 (1980) (citing James & Gray, 
supra note 180, at 523-27). 
194. James & Gray, supra note 180, at 525. 
195. Id. at n.11. In this same footnote the authors cite other sources for "[I]ists of 
confidential relationships." Id. These sources include: Appeal of Darlington, 23 A. 
1046, 1047 (Pa. 1892); David Berger & Joanne Hirsch, Pennsylvania Tort Liability for 
Concealment and Nondisclosure in Business Transactions, 21 TEMP. L.Q. 368, 371 n.17 
(1948); William B. Goldfarb, Fraud and Nondisclosure in the Vendor-Purchaser Rela­
tion, 8 W. RES. L. REV. 5, 32 (1956). 
196. The sources cited by the Supreme Court are RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976) and James & Gray, supra note 180. 
197. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228. See supra text accompanying notes 172-95 for a 
discussion showing that the sources cited by the Chiarella Court support the proposition 
that a family relationship can be either fiduciary or confidential. 
198. 23 A. 1046 (Pa. 1892). In Appeal of Darlington, the court invalidated a note 
for $7,000, signed by an uncle to his nephew, because of the existence of a confidential 
relation between the two, created by a close, dependency relationship. Id. 
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ally all persons who are associated by any relation of trust and 
confidence.199 
The James & Gray article cited a Western Reserve Law Review arti­
cle titled Fraud and Nondisclosure in the Vendor-Purchaser Relation 
for support.2oo The article, written by William B. Goldfarb, identi­
fies some specific trust and confidence relations. "Certain relation­
ships may be called fiduciary-in-Iaw. They are the classical 
relationships of trust and confidence. They include, among others, 
attorney and client, officers of a corporation and shareholders ... 
and siblings [to each other]."201 
Applying Appeal of Darlington and the Goldfarb article to 
Chestman, it seems to follow that a fiduciary or similar relation of 
trust and confidence can be found between either Keith and Susan, 
as husband and wife, or between Keith and the Waldbaum family, 
as family members in a family-controlled corporation. There is a 
plethora of authority from the common law that points to the con­
clusion that a family relationship in certain contexts can be of a 
fiduciary quality.202 When this family relation is put into a family­
controlled corporation context, it is even more compelling to find a 
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission expressed a similar 
position in its amicus curiae brief in support of the rehearing en 
banc in Chestman. "[F]amily members, and especially husbands 
and wives, do not typically deal with each other at arm's length, and 
the characteristics of family relationships do not resemble those of 
companies dealing with each other in the general business world 
...."203 Family members should know, when they are privy to in­
side information solely because of their relationship within the fam­
ily, that such information should stay within the family, and it is not 
something they should be allowed to pass on to others with no ac­
countability for such actions. Thus, the Chestman court failed to 
consider the added element of a family-controlled corporation and 
incorrectly concluded that a family relation within the context of a 
family-controlled corporation is not fiduciary or confidential in 
nature. 
199. [d. at 1047 (emphasis added). 
200. Goldfarb, supra note 195. 
201. [d. at 32 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
202. See supra text accompanying notes 172-201 for authorities supporting prem­
ise that a family relationship is fiduciary. 
203. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission at 14, United States v. 
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 89-1276). 
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The majority opinion says that a family relation is not fiduci­
ary. What the majority opinion ignores is the surrounding circum­
stances. This is not just a family relation per se, it is a family 
relation within the context of a family-controlled corporation. The 
majority opened the door to this interpretation when it said, 
"[a]lthough spouses certainly may by their conduct become fiducia­
ries, the marriage relationship alone does not impose fiduciary sta­
tUS."204 When this admission that spouses can become fiduciaries 
through their conduct is added to the inquiry, it makes it possible to 
find a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence 
under the facts involved, namely the added element of a family­
controlled corporation. Therefore, there is support for the conclu­
sion that a family relationship is fiduciary, in contrast to what the 
majority found. And when the family-controlled corporation con­
text is added to the situation, a finding of a relationship of trust and 
confidence is all the more probable. 
CONCLUSION 
Family members of family-controlled, publicly traded corpora­
tions and their tippees should not be allowed to disclose informa­
tion and perform trades that would be unlawful if in the hands of 
other market participants. The Second Circuit's decision in 
Chestman allows just such behavior on the part of family-controlled 
corporation family members and their tippees. Not only did the 
decision create this safe harbor for family members and their tip­
pees, but the decision is not based on a credible canvass of the law 
in the area. 
As demonstrated by the case law, a family relation is capable 
of being fiduciary or confidential in nature. When the family-con­
trolled corporation context is added to the analysis, it makes even 
more sense to find a fiduciary or confidential relation. Also sup­
ported by the case law is the conclusion that a distinction between 
fiduciary and confidential relationships does exist. Confidential re­
lations require an inquiry into the facts behind each relationship,· 
unlike a fiduciary relationship which is given special designation by 
law. A factual inquiry into the existence of a confidential relation­
ship on a case-by-case basis is both supported by the law in the area 
and represents the best method of netting family members and their 
tippees who deal in nonpublic inside information in the family-con­
204. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (1991) (en bane), cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). 
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trolled corporation context. This is the best way to level the playing 
field and take away the unfair advantage family members and their 
tippees enjoy over the rest of the marketplace in dealing with inside 
information. 
William A. Snider 
